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Executive Summary 
We estimated in our earlier papers that because of the low average incomes 
of recent immigrants, the low taxes they pay and the government services 
they absorb, the fiscal burden on Canadian taxpayers was over $6,000 per 
capita in fiscal year 2005/06, and that the total fiscal burden in that year was 
between $16.3 billion and $23.6 billion. The basic methodology employed 
in our studies has not been challenged and Jason Kenney, the Minister of 
Employment and Social Development cited our studies in a speech as pro-
viding the evidence for “why we [the Government] fundamentally reformed 
our immigration system”.
New data now available from the 2011 National Household Survey 
(NHS) has allowed us to update our earlier estimate in order to shed light on 
the success of the recent major steps taken by the Federal Government to 
improve the selection of new immigrants to improve their economic pros-
pects. We found that the annual net fiscal transfer to recent immigrants is 
significantly lower at $5,329 per capita than the $6,000 we had found in 
our previous analysis. However, because the number of immigrants receiv-
ing this transfer has increased substantially, the total fiscal burden has risen 
from $16 to $24 billion in 2005, to $20 to $28 billion in 2010, to $27 to $35 
billion in 2014. 
One of the government policies that have led to the reduction in the 
per-capita fiscal burden involved the elimination of the backlog of hundreds 
of thousands of immigrants who had already met the specified points criteria 
established for admission. Since this points system had produced the poor 
economic performance of recent immigrants that led to the fiscal burden we 
had calculated and because a number of other problems were associated with 
this backlog, the government basically terminated the automatic admission 
of around one million already approved immigrants. 
More important, the government introduced a number of policies 
to improve the economic prospects of immigrants. These policies involve: 
improved selection criteria in the Federal Skilled Worker program; the intro-
duction of the Canada Experience Class, which gives preference to immi-
grants who have already demonstrated their labour-market skills in Canada 
as Temporary Foreign Workers or students; the implementation of the Federal 
Skilled Trades program for immigrants in 43 targeted occupations with job 
offers in their trades; an expansion of the Provincial Nominee Programs, 
whereby provincial government are able to identify immigrants with skills and 
experience needed in provincial labour markets; and reform of refugee policy.
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While these new policies are in the spirit of the recommendations we 
had made in our earlier studies, they failed to implement the more radical 
policy we had proposed. We had suggested a more complete reliance on 
private-market information to select economic immigrants only if they pos-
sessed a job offer from a Canadian employer paying at least the average wage 
of Canadians in the region where the employer is located.
Most important, these reforms did not address the fundamental issue 
facing Canadian immigration policies: it left unchanged the total number 
admitted annually. As a result, while the new criteria lower the per-capita 
burden, the total fiscal burden continued to rise and will continue to do 
so in the future. The 260,000 to 285,000 planned immigrant admissions 
announced by the Immigration Minister for 2015 will add from $1.4 billion 
to $1.5 billion to the burden annually, with a similar increment every year 
thereafter as long as the high targeted level of immigration is maintained.
We conclude that the new policies adopted by the government serve 
Canadians well by reducing the per-capita fiscal burden of immigrants but 
suggest that more policies in this spirit are needed and that the number of 
annual immigrants needs to be reduced to bring about a substantial reduc-
tion in total fiscal burden imposed by new immigrants on Canadian taxpayers.
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Introduction
As Milton Friedman so wisely observed: “You cannot simultaneously have 
free immigration and a welfare state” (Friedman, 1999). This, of course, is an 
observation based on pure free-market economic theory. If people can immi-
grate, they will as long as they can improve their standards of living enough 
to offset the economic and non-economic costs of moving. The higher social 
benefits usually offered in the destination country contribute to higher living 
standards for immigrants just as wages do and are thus part of the economic 
benefits of immigration weighed by immigrants. But unlike wages, which 
reflect the immigrants’ contribution to the destination country’s output, fiscal 
benefits must be paid for by the population already living in the destination 
country, creating a net fiscal burden on the country’s existing residents and 
consequently reducing their living standards. The tendency of immigrants to 
be attracted by social benefits is based on the economic theory of maximizing 
utility, where it is posited that more after-tax income including social benefits 
is preferred to less. The extent to which immigration generates a net fiscal 
burden, however, is an empirical question that depends largely on the extent 
to which immigrants earn less than other Canadians and thus pay less tax 
for the services they receive, which, as a general rule, are the same as those 
received by other residents. The exact magnitude of any net fiscal burden is 
an empirical question that can only be answered by the type of analysis (and 
resulting estimate) offered in this paper.
Our previous estimate (Grubel and Grady, 2011, 2012) that recent 
immigrants coming to Canada between 1987 and 2004 received fiscal trans-
fers of over $6,000 per capita in fiscal year 2005/06 and that the fiscal burden 
in that year was about $16 to $24 billion per year gave rise to much contro-
versy because of its obvious implications for a restrictive immigration policy 
(Javdani and Pendakur, 2011).1 But our methodology remains the only one 
yet offered that is capable of producing credible estimates of the net fiscal 
cost of immigration and so can serve as a guide for the development of an 
1. Our earlier estimates produced using census data were made to refine the cruder esti-
mates first produced by Grubel (2005). It is our intention to update the estimates when-
ever significant new data is released or new information comes available. And we will 
continue to refine our methodologies based on the comments we receive. For that reason, 
we welcomed the criticisms of Javdani and Pendakur (2011), which we believe helped 
us to improve the quality of our estimates. Moreover, since we believe that our meth-
odology is the only credible scientific approach that has been offered, we were pleased 
that they adopted it even though they made some assumptions we regard to be highly 
questionable. ➤
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evidence-based immigration policy. Indeed, the Minister of Employment 
and Social Development cited it as providing the evidence for “why we [the 
Government] fundamentally reformed our immigration system” (Kenney, 
2014: 17). This indicates that no plausible alternative methodology for assess-
ing the fiscal implications of immigration exists.
Since new data for 2010 is now available from the 2011 National 
Household Survey (NHS), which, we note, is itself a subject of some contro-
versy (Grady, 2015a), we have updated our earlier estimate to incorporate this 
most recent information. This is important because the Federal Government 
has taken a number of major steps to improve the selection of immigrants 
from the point of view of their labour-market readiness and it is important 
to determine if they are sufficient to halt the growing fiscal cost of immigra-
tion identified in our earlier papers. An assessment of the impact of these 
measures on the various immigration streams is provided in Grady, 2015b.
Since we support the main thrust of the Government’s immigration 
policy reforms to refocus immigration policy more on economic class immi-
grants who are more likely to succeed in the competitive Canadian labour 
market, we are pleased to report that our new estimate of the net fiscal trans-
fer to recent immigrants is significantly lower at $5,329 per capita per year 
in 2010 than our previous estimate of $6,051 in 2005, subsequently revised 
to $6,329 (Grubel and Grady, 2011, 2012). 
The Federal Government’s efforts to select immigrants who are pre-
pared to succeed in Canada’s labour market must be given full credit for their 
ambitiousness. Indeed, they encountered much resistance and were severely 
attacked by the immigration lobby, which strongly opposes any actions to 
restrict unimpeded mass immigration. The most important measure intro-
duced was the elimination of the growing backlog of immigrants who had 
met the specified points criteria established for admission and who hence 
had to be admitted under the legal interpretation of the phrase “shall be 
admitted” in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The prospective 
immigrants already selected numbered around a million and been waiting 
to be admitted for years and were not getting any younger. The problem was 
that the Government had determined that, if admitted, they would be likely 
Specifically, the difference between our estimates and Javdani and Pendakur’s 
can be attributed to two assumptions. First, Javdani and Pendakur used estimates of 
the incomes of immigrants that arrived over the period from 1970 to 2004, which were 
higher than the incomes of the 1987–2004 immigrant cohort used in our study because 
the immigrants admitted in the earlier period came mostly from traditional source coun-
tries and earned much higher incomes than more recent cohorts of immigrants. Second, 
they assumed that 10% of total government spending involved “pure public goods” such 
as defence, to which they believe immigrants need not contribute. It is noteworthy that 
in spite of making these unreasonable assumptions, they still ended up with a significant 
cost of recent immigration.
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to experience labour-market difficulties stemming from their inadequate 
employment and language skills, thus exacerbating the growing income gap 
between recent immigrants and other Canadians.
The wide-ranging reforms introduced by the Government refocused the 
selection of immigrants more on employability and less on education, following 
the Australian and New Zealand models (Hawthorne, 2011) and moving mod-
estly in the direction we discussed in our earlier papers (Grubel and Grady, 2011, 
2012). This included: improved selection criteria in the Federal Skilled Worker 
program; the introduction of the Canada Experience Class, which gives prefer-
ence to immigrants who have already demonstrated their labour-market skills 
in Canada as Temporary Foreign Workers or students; the implementation of 
the Federal Skilled Trades program for immigrants in 43 targeted occupations 
with job offers in their trades; and an expansion of the Provincial Nominee 
Programs, whereby provincial government are able to identify immigrants with 
skills and experience needed in provincial labour markets. 
While it is a source of concern that the per-capita improvement in the 
net fiscal burden identified in this paper is relatively modest given the relative 
ambitiousness of the reforms in selection introduced (which however stopped 
short of basing admission on a job offer paying higher than the average wage 
as recommended in our earlier papers even for economic class immigrants), 
it is even more worrying that the overall net cost of fiscal transfers to recent 
immigrants has continued to grow, reaching $20 to $28 billion in 2010 (and 
$27 to $35 billion in 2014), up from our earlier estimate of $16 to $24 billion in 
2005. To put this number in perspective, it is large enough to account for a sub-
stantial proportion of the $56.9 billion Canadian consolidated government-
sector net borrowing in 2013 (the latest year available at the time of writing). 
On the other hand, it is encouraging to note that the Government has 
introduced a new Express Entry Program effective January 2015 (Government 
of Canada, 2015). This program promises further improvement in the per-
formance of immigrants by allowing prospective immigrants to submit pro-
files and then inviting the top-ranking candidates to submit applications for 
permanent residence under several existing federal programs designed to 
attract the most able immigrants with job offers and/or skills and experience. 
(It also makes the applicant inventory available to provincial and territorial 
governments for use in their Provincial Nominee Programs.) 
Obviously, however, the success of this Express Entry Program cannot 
be evaluated until enough time has passed to generate reliable data on the 
performance of those selected. A concern we have with the Express Entry 
Program is that it is not clear if it puts an adequate emphasis on selecting 
high-wage immigrants. If not, it could still allow applicants to qualify who 
would impose a net fiscal burden on Canadian taxpayers. There is also the 
question of the number and performance of family-class immigrants admit-
ted that accompany or are sponsored by the Express Entry immigrants. 
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The Data
The new data that is now available in the convenient form of a Public Use 
Microdata File (PUMF) on CD comes from the 2011 National Household 
Survey (Statistics Canada, 2014a). This was a voluntary survey that replaced 
the long-form census questionnaire. While such statistical changes are usu-
ally boring affairs only noted by statisticians and economists, this replacement 
turned out to be anything but, triggering the resignation of the Chief Statistician 
and igniting a controversy that is still raging more than four years later, with 
a bill to reintroduce the mandatory long-form questionnaire being debated 
and angry op-ed pieces still appearing in the Globe and Mail (Jacobsen, 2014).
When the new National Household Survey (NHS) was published, like 
most economists and commentators, we had fairly low expectations. We 
thought that it would probably turn out to be fairly useless as claimed by many 
economists because of the low response rates often associated with volun-
tary surveys and because of the difficulty of making comparisons of data of 
interest across time given the change in methodology. We recognized that 
the long form had the advantage of consistency of approach across time and 
that this facilitated intertemporal comparisons of data.
But when we actually looked at the 2011 NHS, we were pleasantly sur-
prised. The first thing we noted about the PUMF was that it was free, which is 
something as economists we cannot ignore. This was a particularly welcome 
development as the 2006 Census PUMF we used in our previous estimate 
cost $1,150 plus 5% GST, which we had to pay out of our own pockets. It can-
not be emphasized too much that Statistics Canada’s new policy of making all 
its data available free of charge to all Canadians is a great improvement over 
its previous policy of restricting access through high user fees. In our view, 
this should be quite helpful in encouraging researchers to actually use the 
data and not just result in the collection of data for its own sake. The previ-
ous policy of spending vast sums of money on collecting data that were too 
expensive for many researchers to use did not make much sense. Once the 
data was collected, they were in effect a public good, which could and should 
be provided to all at a zero marginal cost.
Statistics Canada notes in the user guide (2014a: 5) that the content 
of the 2011 PUMF is largely the same as that of the 2006 PUMF. It cautions, 
however, that there are various changes, resulting from content changes in 
the 2011 NHS, as well as the creation of new variables from existing questions 
or the use of updated classifications on existing questions. These include: the 
addition of 20 new variables; the removal of 13 old variables; and a change of 
universe to Mobility, Generation status, and Place of birth of parents variables. 
Immigration and the Welfare State Revisted / 5
fraserinstitute.org
On examining the data, we were pleased to discover that the basic structure 
of the long-form questionnaire had been retained and that a key question was 
included allowing respondents to link their responses to their tax forms as 
had been done in the census long form. This resulted in the preservation of 
most of the data series collected in the census and in a database that even used 
the same names for most of the 124 variables included. Thus, the computer 
code we had previously used to process the long-form data only required 
relatively minor adjustments to work with the NHS data. The sample size 
included in the PUMF of 887,012 was also comparable, representing 2.7% of 
the Canadian population. 
A concern we had in using the data was that its integrity would be com-
promised by a low response rate. This concern, happily, was alleviated by the 
rigorous reliability checking carried out by Statistics Canada and reported in 
the dictionary and PUMF user guide. A very sophisticated statistical meth-
odology was used for sampling and weighting to ensure that the sample was 
representative of the population. This is the approach that Statistics Canada 
has pioneered and used with great success with all its voluntary surveys to 
produce reliable information. Statistics Canada’s statisticians are definitely 
professionals capable of getting the most information out of voluntary surveys.
With a sampling rate of about three in 10 and an overall response rate of 
68.6%, Statistics Canada estimated that about 21% of the Canadian population 
participated in the NHS (2014b: 12). Not coincidentally, this is comparable to 
the population participating in the long-form census questionnaire in 2006, 
which was provided to one in five households. Thus it is hard to argue that 
Statistics Canada did not obtain information from enough people.
While the response rates to the individual questions were lower than 
in the 2006 Census as expected with a voluntary survey (59.3% compared 
to 67.4% for income; and 57.6% ccompared to 76.6% for income tax paid), 
the data was judged to be of publishable quality by Statistics Canada after 
its usual rigorous editing and consistency checks and comparisons with the 
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID)2 and the Annual Estimates 
for Census Families and Individuals or T1 Family File (T1FF), an income tax 
data file prepared for the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). 
According to Statistics Canada (2014c: 15–16), the estimates of the 
number of income recipients from the NHS estimates of 2010 income are 
between the estimates from the 2010 SLID (3.2% lower) and the 2010 T1FF 
(2.7% higher). But the NHS estimate of median total income was 4.0% greater 
than that from the 2010 SLID and 2.3% more than in the 2010 T1FF. Estimates 
of income tax from the NHS are also between the SLID and the T1FF.
2. Incidentally, the last release from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics was 
June 27, 2013. Thus, this source of information will not exist as a crosscheck for future 
National Household Surveys.
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Based on the relative closeness of these comparisons and Statistics 
Canada’s confidence in the reliability of the data as evidenced by their will-
ingness to publish the survey results, albeit with the usual caveats about the 
reliability of the more granular data based on fewer observations, we are def-
initely comfortable enough to use it in this paper to update our estimates of 
the net fiscal cost of recent immigration.
A remaining issue with the NHS data is that it does not provide a break-
down by year of immigration prior to 1990, but instead groups the data for 
all immigrants admitted between 1985 and 1989 together. Since our previ-
ous estimate was for recent immigrants admitted after 1987 because this was 
the year that immigration was stepped up with a larger proportion of immi-
grants coming from non-traditional source countries, we have revised our 
definition of recent immigrants to include immigrants admitted after 1985. 
This means that immigrants admitted in 1985 and 1986 are included in our 
sample this time when they were not in our earlier papers. This will bias our 
estimate of per-capita net fiscal cost downward and our estimate of total fis-
cal cost upward. Correspondingly, the category “Canadian residents exclud-
ing recent immigrants” includes everybody else, that is, the native born and 
immigrants landing before 1985.
While the NHS data did not pose any problems when we were preparing 
our estimate, we did have to overcome a significant data gap in seeking to obtain 
the Consolidated Government Sector data from the Financial Management 
System that is also used in our calculations. The last fiscal year published is 
2008/09, which was released in May 3, 2010 (Statistics Canada, 2010). This 
government-sector data, which is no longer published, is important because it 
provides a functional breakdown of expenditures, which can be used in allocat-
ing spending to beneficiaries. Unfortunately, Statistics Canada has now moved 
to publishing Government Finance Statistics using the international standard 
system developed by the International Monetary Fund. While this data is useful 
for many international comparative purposes, it lacks the detailed program-
matic breakdown of spending by function derived from program budgeting. 
Statistics Canada’s decision to no longer publish functional detail of 
expenditures is surprising as most analysts require such detail to develop 
an understanding of what governments are actually spending their money 
on. A breakdown by economic object does not suffice to fill this gap. It is 
important to know if governments are spending on such areas as education, 
health or social programs, and not just on such categories as compensation 
or non-wage goods and services. And the problem is compounded for federal 
systems where the functional spending is divided among different levels of 
government. In a unitary state, a functional breakdown can usually be easily 
produced from the annual budget, but this is a much more difficult task when 
there are many provincial and municipal governments, each with their own 
budgets that need to be consolidated. 
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It is ironic that every time we carried out a Public Expenditure Review 
for the World Bank in some developing country we would have to either 
obtain or prepare a functional breakdown of government spending as an 
essential input to our review of public spending priorities yet Canada, with 
arguably the world’s best statistical agency, no longer prepares such basic 
information.
If we were to follow exactly the same methodology as we did in our 
two previous estimates, we would use fiscal data for fiscal year 2010/11 with 
our NHS data for calendar 2010. However, since the data for that year is not 
available, we have to use the data on revenues and expenditures for 2008/09, 
the latest year available, as a proxy. This probably biases downward our net 
fiscal costs estimates of both per-capita and total costs.
The Estimate 
Income
The tabulation of the income and tax data from the NHS is shown in table 1. 
It covers the cohort of 3.7 million immigrants who arrived in Canada over the 
period of 24 years from 1985 to 2009, as represented by the sample of 104,604 
immigrants in the database.3 In 2010, they had an average income of $32,922 
on which they paid an average of $4,567 in income taxes. The comparable fig-
ures for all Canadian residents excluding recent immigrants were an average 
income of $41,935 and income taxes of $6,885, based on the entire sample 
of 774,210 individuals but only including those aged 15 and over for whom 
data was also available. This represented 28.9 million people. The table also 
shows the average employment income for the two groups (also used in the 
per-capita cost calculations in table 2). The main differences between income 
and employment income are that the former includes transfer payments as 
well as earnings from investments.
3. Recent immigrants arriving in 2010 (and first four months of 2011), who were in the 
full sample, were not included in the sample used as they were not in the country for a 
full year in 2010 (or not at all) and would thus bias downwards the income and tax esti-
mates. Also not included in the income and tax compilations were: immigrants for whom 
the income and tax data was not available; or immigrants under 15 for whom the data 
was not applicable.
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The last row of table 1 shows the ratio of the average income of immigrants 
to the average income of all Canadian residents excluding recent immigrants: 
78.5%; and the ratio of employment income: 89.0%; and the ratio of income taxes 
paid: 66.3%, which was derived by dividing rows (1) and (2). The income ratios 
are larger than the tax ratio because the progressivity of the income-tax system 
results in all Canadian residients except recent immigrants paying a proportion-
ately higher amount in taxes than recent immigrants because of their higher 
incomes. The ratio for taxes paid of 66.3% is used in calculating income tax in 
table 2. It is noteworthy that all of the ratios used are slightly higher than in our 
previous estimates, indicating that the relative performance of recent immi-
grants has improved, undoubtedly because of the improved selection under 
the Conservative Government’s reformed immigration policy.
Taxes
The data on income and taxes compiled from the NHS is used in table 2 to 
allocate the government revenues in Canada that are raised not only through 
the personal income taxes, but also through all the other taxes and revenue 
sources. The types of taxes are shown in column (1), while column (2) gives 
the total revenue raised by each type of tax. Column (3) shows the percentage 
distribution of revenues among the various categories. Column (4a) translates 
this total into per-capita amounts, based on the country’s estimated popula-
tion of 33.246 million on July 1, 2008, which corresponds most closely with 
the 2008/09 fiscal year. Column (4b) adjusts this amount so that it represents 
taxes paid by Canadian residents excluding recent immigrants.
Table 1: Income and taxes paid by recent immigrants and other Canadians in 2010
  Average  
Income
Average 
Employment 
Income
Average Income  
Tax Paid
Number of 
Observations  
in Survey
Population
(1) Recent immigrants 1985–2009 $32,922 $27,230 $4,567 104,644 3,696,683
(2) All Canadian residents except 
recent immigrants
$41,935 $30,581 $6,885 774,210 28,863,389
(1) / (2) 78.5% 89.0% 66.3%
Note: Recent immigrants are compared with all Canadian residents excluding recent immigrants since they are the most relevant 
comparator group.
Source: Calculations by authors made from the 2011 National Household Survey PUMF (Statistics Canada, 2014a). Total income is pro-
vided by the variable totinc in the file, and income tax by the variable inctax, both of which are averaged across individuals to calculate 
averages. All recent immigrants and Canadian residients reporting income or income tax were included in the sample. The main differ-
ences between income and employment income are that the former includes transfer payments as well as earnings from investments.
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The crucial estimate for our analysis is the taxes paid per capita by 
recent immigrants in each of the types of taxes, as shown in Column (6). It 
is unfortunate that this information is not available from publically available 
sources, nor can it be extracted from the PUMF database. Therefore, the 
ratios shown in Column (5) are based on assumptions spelled out below, but 
are deliberately biased in favour of overstating rather than understating the 
amounts of taxes paid by immigrants. Thus, the ratio for health and social 
insurance levies is assumed to be 100% on the grounds that these taxes are 
levied on only a maximum level of income that is reached by most immi-
grants. The ratio for general sales taxes is assumed to be 78.5% on the grounds 
that the federal value-added tax and provincial sales taxes are levied on con-
sumer expenditures that are related to average income ratios. The ratio for 
Table 2: Taxes paid by recent immigrants and other Canadians, all levels of 
government, 2008/09
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5) (6) (7)
Type of tax Total revenue 
raised  
($ millions)
Distribution of 
total revenue  
(%)
Total revenue 
raised per 
capita, all 
Canadians  
($) 
Total revenue 
raised per 
capita, Canadian 
residents 
excluding recent 
immigrants 
($)
Taxes paid by 
recent immigrants 
as % of taxes paid 
by all Canadian 
residents excluding 
recent immigrants  
(%)
Taxes paid 
per capita 
by recent 
Immigrants  
($)
Difference in 
per-capita 
tax; (6)−(4b)  
($)
Personal income 
taxes
196,632 33.9 5,914 6,150 66.3 4,079 −2,071
Health & social 
insurance levies
93,850 16.2 2,823 2,823 100.0 2,823 0
General sales 
taxes
67,001 11.5 2,015 2,066 78.5 1,622 −444
Corporate taxes 56,828 9.8 1,709 1,857 30.0 557 −1,300
Property and 
related taxes
52,460 9.0 1,578 1,617 78.5 1,270 −348
Other taxes and 
revenues
113,733 19.6 3,421 3,507 78.5 2,753 −754
Total 580,504 100 17,461 18,019 n.a. 13,103 −4,916
Note: The total taxes paid include those paid by recent immigrants. The dollars per capita figures paid by Canadian residents ex-
cluding recent immigrants were calculated taking into account the ratio of taxes paid by recent immigrants so that the sum of the 
dollars paid by the two groups weighted by their share of the population equals the total taxes paid. Personal income taxes includes 
taxes on payments to non-residents. Health & social insurance levies includes payroll taxes. Corporate taxes includes capital taxes, 
and natural resource licenses and fees. Property and related taxes excludes capital taxes. Other taxes and revenues includes all other 
revenues except for the sales of goods and services of $53,168 million, which are excluded. The total consolidated government rev-
enue reported by Statistics Canada including the sales of goods and services adds up to $633,672 million.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010; calculations by authors.
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corporate income taxes is assumed to be 30% because recent immigrants 
are judged likely to hold only small amounts of common stocks that bear the 
burden of the corporate income tax. In support of this assumption, we note 
that according to the PUMF data the immigrants’ investment income is only 
a fraction of the average for all Canadians and that this probably includes 
a disproportionate amount of investments other than corporate stocks. It 
was assumed that the amounts paid as property and related taxes and other 
taxes were related to total income. The last row in table 2 shows the sum of 
all taxes paid by the average recent immigrant ($13,103) and the average of all 
Canadian residents excluding recent immigrants ($18,019) in the fiscal year 
2008/09 (ending March 31, 2009). Thus recent immigrants paid on average 
$4,916 less than non-recent immigrants, which gives us the tax part of the 
net cost of recent immigrants to the fisc.
Benefits received
Our updated calculations of the expenditure component of the net fiscal 
transfer to recent immigrants are presented in table 3. Column (1) lists the 
different types of spending programs, column (2) total expenditures, and col-
umn (3a) expenditures per capita for all Canadians based on a population of 
33.2 million as of July 1, 2008. The amounts in table 3 represent the spend-
ing by all levels of Canadian government, consolidated so as to remove inter-
governmental transfers. Program spending excludes debt-service payments 
of $43.634 billion, which do not provide current services for Canadians and 
immigrants. This exclusion is considered reasonable on the grounds that, to 
the extent that the past deficits necessitating the interest payments resulted 
in the creation of tangible assets like infrastructure and the maintenance of 
intangible assets like freedom and the Canadian way of life, they provide bene-
fits that accrue equally to Canadians and immigrants. Column (3b) adjusts 
these figures to make them applicable to non-recent immigrants. 
The figures in column (4) are central to the calculation of net fiscal 
costs presented in the next subsection. They show the percentage assumed 
to apply to the benefits received on average by recent immigrants relative to 
the benefits received by all Canadians under each type of program. In most 
columns, this figure is 100% and reflects the view that recent immigrants 
benefit as much per-capita as do other Canadians. In some cases, such as 
in the category, Environment, the underlying rationale should be obvious. 
Most readers will agree that all persons in Canada benefit equally from the 
maintenance or improvement in the quality of the environment. Most of the 
other spending categories to which the 100% figure has been applied should 
be similarly obvious and were discussed in our previous papers, which we do 
not propose to duplicate here (Grubel and Grady, 2011, 2012). 
Immigration and the Welfare State Revisted / 11
fraserinstitute.org
Table 3: Benefits received by Canadian residents excluding recent immigrants,  
all levels of government, 2008/09
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4) (5) (6)
Type of government expenditure  
(program spending)
Total 
expenditure  
($ millions)
Per-capita 
benefits 
received by 
all Canadian 
residents  
($)
Per-capita 
benefits 
received by 
non-recent 
immigrants  
($)
Benefits received 
by recent 
Immigrants (% of 
Canadian residents 
excluding recent 
immigrants)
Per-capita 
benefits 
received 
by recent 
Immigrants  
($)
Difference in 
per-capita 
benefits
(5)–(3b)  
($)
General government services 22,822 686 686 100.0 686 0
Protection of persons and property 50,790 1,528 1,566 78.5 1,229 −337
Health 121,577 3,657 3,657 100.0 3,657 0
Social services 190,276 5,723 5,723 100.0 5,723 0
Education        
Elementary and secondary education 50,941 1,532 1,510 113.0 1,706 196
Post-secondary education  39,670 1,193 1,134 146.0 1,656 522
Special retraining services 3,615 109 109 100.0 109 0
Other education 1,506 45 45 100.0 45 0
Recreation and culture 16,306 490 490 100.0 490 0
Labour, employment, and immigration 2,395 72 70 120.0 85 14
Housing 6,120 184 182 110.0 200 18
Regional planning and development 2,775 83 83 100.0 83 0
Transportation and communication 32,197 968 968 100.0 968 0
Resource conservation; industrial development 19,975 601 601 100.0 601 0
Environment 16,933 509 509 100.0 509 0
Foreign affairs and international assistance 6,508 196 196 100.0 196 0
Research establishments 2,268 68 68 100.0 68 0
Other expenditures 945 28 28 100.0 28 0
Total 587,619 17,675 17,628 18,042 414
Note: Spending categories for which the immigrants are estimated to receive lower or higher benefits are shown, e.g., Protection of 
persons and property.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010; calculations by authors.
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Turning now to a discussion of the spending categories for which the 
recent immigrants are estimated to receive lower or higher benefits. For pro-
tection of persons and property, we assume that the benefits from protection 
are proportional to income. Since the income of recent immigrants is 78.5% 
of that of Canadian residents excluding recent immigrants, this figure is used. 
It should be noted that this is a conservative assumption as a case could be 
made for using a figure of 100% since it could be argued that recent immi-
grants benefit just as much as other Canadians from the prevention of crime 
and many live in urban areas with higher crime rates that require higher per-
capita expenditures on police.
The percentage for spending on education is based on an analysis of 
the underlying components, most notably primary and secondary education, 
and post-secondary education (Statistics Canada, 2010). For primary and 
secondary education, it is assumed that recent immigrants obtain a benefit 
of 113% of the amount for Canadian residents excluding recent immigrants. 
This reflects the fact that, according to the NHS, recent immigrants received 
a per-capita share of child benefits that is almost double that received by non-
immigrant families, but it also makes a generous allowance for the fact that 
the child benefit is income tested, inflating this number somewhat. For post-
secondary education, it is assumed that the benefit is 146% of the average of 
non-recent immigrants, reflecting the fact that school attendance above the 
age of 19 for recent immigrants is correspondingly above the Canadian aver-
age, as noted by Javdani and Pendakur (2011).
Spending on labour, employment, and immigration is assumed to 
benefit immigrants 20% more than other Canadians because they have more 
dealings with the government on immigration issues related to the family 
reunification program, the processing of refugee claims, and related issues. 
The low average incomes of immigrants also lead to the use of more benefits 
under programs that deal with labour markets and employment.
Housing is the final category of spending that recent immigrants are 
assumed to use more than other Canadian residents. The assumption is that 
immigrants benefit by 10% more on the grounds that upon arrival many have 
temporary access to free or heavily subsidized housing while they settle and 
find employment. Furthermore, the many low-income immigrant families 
benefit disproportionately from government programs designed to make 
housing more affordable, particularly in the urban areas where they tend to 
settle. Again, it could be argued that these are fairly conservative assumptions.
In total, the difference in the average per-capita amount of benefits of 
recent immigrants is $414 (shown in the last row of table 3). This is equal to 
the $18,042 in total benefits received by recent immigrants minus the $17,628 
received by other Canadian residents.
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The net fiscal cost
The net fiscal cost imposed on other Canadian residents by recent immigrants 
through provisions of the welfare state can be calculated by adding the lower 
taxes paid by recent immigrants to the higher spending benefits, that is, the 
$4,916 in lower taxes plus the $414 in higher benefits for a total net fiscal bene-
fit of $5,329. This estimate of the per-capita net fiscal cost in 2010 of recent 
immigration over the period from 1985 to 2009 is the most important find-
ing of this paper. Note that it results primarily from the lower taxes paid by 
recent immigrants and not from higher fiscal benefits from greater spending.
There are two possible estimates for the number of recent immigrants 
in the country in 2009 who were admitted over the period from 1985 to 2009. 
The first comes from the NHS itself. According to it, there were 3,696,683 
recent immigrants arriving between 1985 and 2009 who were still in the coun-
try in 2010. If this is multiplied by the per-capita cost, the total cost of recent 
immigrants in 2010 would be $19.7 billion (excluding immigrants admitted 
in 2010 and not residing in the country for the complete year). Alternatively, 
the second estimate of recent immigrants comes from the administrative data 
from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. It shows that 5,307,597 immi-
grants were admitted from 1985 to 2009. This figure is higher than that from 
the NHS because it includes all immigrants who legally entered the country 
and makes no allowance for those who subsequently emigrate. It is also based 
on administrative data that is comprehensive and not subject to sampling 
errors like the NHS. If this administrative figure is multiplied by the per-
capita cost, the total cost of recent immigrants in 2010 would be significantly 
higher at $28.3 billion.
Further, if you add the 1,298,449 immigrants arriving between 2010 
and 2014 from the administrative data, the total fiscal cost of immigration 
would be increased by another $6.9 billion, yielding an estimated range of 
$26.6 to $35.2 billion. 
Barring a miraculous improvement in earnings, the net fiscal cost of 
recent immigrants will continue to grow as more immigrants are admitted. At 
a per-capita net fiscal cost of $5,329, the 260,000 to 285,000 planned immi-
grant admissions announced by the Immigration Minister for 2015 should 
add another $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion to the cost, with a similar increment 
coming every year thereafter as long as the high targeted level of immigra-
tion is maintained. All this is, of course, subject to the proviso that there is 
no dramatic further improvement in the labour market performance of new 
immigrants that is sufficient to offset their growing numbers.
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Conclusions
The net fiscal cost of immigration has continued to increase in spite of the 
extremely ambitious immigration policy reforms introduced by a Conservative 
Government committed to ensuring that immigration produces benefits and 
not costs for Canada. Reforms to immigrant selection like those introduced 
since 2006 by the Conservative Government can be, and have been, success-
ful in reducing the per-capita cost of immigration. Nevertheless, based on the 
results so far, it is hard to see how such reforms can produce large enough 
reductions in the per-capita fiscal cost of newly admitted immigrants to stem 
the growing absolute net fiscal cost of mass immigration. This is because the 
improved selection criteria only apply to the principal applicants admitted 
and not to the related family class immigrants who are much more numer-
ous and tend not to be as economically successful.
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